United Nations S/2012/283

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 May 2012

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2010 (2011), in which the Council requested me to report on all aspects of the resolution every four months. The report provides an update on major developments that occurred in Somalia on the three major tracks of the United Nations approach — (a) political; (b) security; and (c) humanitarian, recovery and development, and human rights — in the period from the issuance of my report of 9 December 2011 (S/2011/759) to 15 April 2012. On some issues I provided an update to the Council in my report of 31 January 2012 (S/2012/74). The report also assesses the progress made in the implementation of the road map for ending the transition.

II. Political

2. There has been progress on the political and security fronts in Somalia in recent months. Transitional Federal Government and allied forces have established a presence in key strategic towns in southern and central Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government has begun outreach to newly recovered areas. Meanwhile, implementation of the road map of September 2011 on ending the transition has continued, with agreement among stakeholders on modalities for the formation of a Constituent Assembly, the new Federal Parliament, and elections.

3. As the end of the transition comes within sight, political stakes continue to rise. Tensions have emerged over the selection of representatives to the Constituent Assembly. After rejecting the road map and the Garoowe process, a group of parliamentarians threatened to conduct a parallel election for President on 30 April. Meanwhile, the suicide attack in the National Theatre on 4 April, allegedly targeting the Prime Minister, has further increased mistrust within the transitional federal institutions and among political actors in Mogadishu.

4. The reporting period also saw increased tensions between "Puntland", "Somaliland" and the Transitional Federal Government following the formation of the self-proclaimed "Khaatumo State" in the disputed Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions in northern Somalia.

12-31974 (E) 040512

Please recycle

A. Implementation of the road map

5. Mechanisms to expedite the delivery of priority tasks continue to function. The Office of the Prime Minister established an Implementation Support Unit on 10 January. The Technical Committee on the implementation of the road map met on 20 March in Mogadishu and the International Coordination and Monitoring Group on 30 March in Nairobi. The Group noted the efforts of Somali stakeholders and appealed for international support to the process of ending the transition on schedule.

6. Implementation of the road map is proceeding, and considerable tasks have been accomplished. Some have been delayed, however, owing mainly to the lack of resources and the continued crisis within the Transitional Federal Parliament. The following progress was made on the four priority tasks to end the transition by 20 August 2012:

Security

7. There was steady progress in the delivery of the security benchmark, including establishment of district security committees in Mogadishu and finalization of an action plan on preventing child recruitment. However, the National Security and Stabilization Plan is still pending adoption owing to the impasse in Parliament.

Constitution

8. The second Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference, held in Garoowe, "Puntland", from 15 to 17 February 2012 (Garoowe II; see annex II), confirmed principles agreed at Garoowe I (see annex I), and reached consensus on modalities for the adoption of the Constitution and the formation of the new bicameral federal Parliament; the federal structure of Somalia, including the status of the capital city, Mogadishu; the structure of the federal executive; and elements of the design of an electoral system. It also agreed a minimum 30 per cent women's representation in Parliament and in other institutions set up to end the transition. Despite this progress, some crucial questions remain regarding the implementation of the agreed principles.

9. On 26 March, at a meeting in Gaalkacyo, the signatories of the road map agreed to reduce the total membership of the Constituent Assembly from the 1,000 delegates envisaged at Garoowe to 825, to facilitate use of the "4.5" formula for clan representation. Both the Constituent Assembly and the new Federal Parliament would be selected by 135 traditional leaders following consultations with religious leaders, intellectuals, youth, women, and business people. The signatories agreed on the creation of a technical selection committee, in place of the earlier envisaged Independent Interim Electoral Commission, to review nominated candidates and assist the traditional leaders. This is now being established. These amendments, however, raised concerns including among the civil society organizations that met in Entebbe, Uganda, from 23 to 26 March, to discuss their role in designating members of the new institutions.

10. Meanwhile, the draft Constitution itself remained under discussion, and has yet to be released for public consultation. While the new Constitution will remain interim pending the conduct of a public referendum, it is notable that some key contentious issues remain unresolved, such as the role of sharia. Some actors have

sought to restrict language on fundamental rights and freedoms in the draft Constitution. Technical assistance continues to be provided to the drafters.

11. Throughout the reporting period, the Transitional Federal Parliament remained at an impasse. The group of parliamentarians who declared the Speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, deposed in December continued to reject the Garoowe process and insisted on having the road map brought before Parliament. The group decided on 4 April to establish an electoral committee and voted that elections for the position of President be brought forward from August to 30 April. The President, the Council of Ministers and the National Security Committee declared the actions of those Members of Parliament illegal. My Special Representative and his international and regional partners are consulting Somali stakeholders on a solution. As the Transitional Federal Parliament has become dysfunctional, the other transitional institutions are working to overcome legal hurdles and proceed with the adoption of pending legislation.

Political outreach and reconciliation

12. In January, the Transitional Federal Government issued a national policy for reconciliation and stabilization in newly liberated areas of south-central Somalia. It also established a National Steering Committee to promote social reconciliation and restore law, order and justice in those areas. Meanwhile, two high-level delegations of Ministers and parliamentarians, led by the Prime Minister and the Speaker, respectively, visited the newly recovered towns of Beledweyne and Baidoa. On 21 March a mission organized jointly by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM travelled to Baidoa and met with its interim Governor, Abdifatah Mohamed Ibrahim Gesey.

13. On 29 March, my Special Representative met with representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and AMISOM to harmonize the approaches to reconciliation and reconstruction in newly recovered areas in support of the Transitional Federal Government policy on reconciliation and stabilization. He also met with the Transitional Federal Government in an effort to ensure that international support is coherent and coordinated, supporting consultations through a series of meetings with donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. To this end, UNPOS, UNSOA and AMISOM are facilitating a mapping of stakeholders in south-central Somalia, to analyse the power dynamics in these areas, the political and security leadership present, their alignment and capacities. This will in turn facilitate the development of a revised political strategy, and aid the establishment of the appropriate security arrangements that consolidate the military gains in these areas.

Good governance

14. Although the Cabinet adopted the national budget in December 2011, approval by Parliament is pending because of the ongoing impasse. Meanwhile, a special legal provision allows government institutions to be funded for three months renewable, pending approval of the national budget. The Transitional Federal Government agreed to create an Anti-Corruption Commission by reviving the 1968 Anti-Corruption law and reinstituting the former Bureau of Investigation and Anti-Corruption.

15. At the request of the Transitional Federal Government, a technical workshop was convened on 15 and 16 February by the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Customs Organization and the International Maritime Organization to look at ways to improve Customs and revenue collection at Mogadishu port. The adoption of the World Customs Organization Columbus Programme was noted as a possible option.

16. The Transitional Federal Government adopted the Somali National Communications Act on 22 March. The Communications Act will create a National Communications Commission to regulate both telecommunications and broadcasting.

B. International support for the political process

17. Improved security in Mogadishu has allowed for more engagement with the Somali leadership. The relocation of UNPOS, and visits to Mogadishu by several senior foreign dignitaries, helped to reaffirm international solidarity and engagement with the Government and the people of Somalia. Following his relocation from Nairobi to Mogadishu on 24 January, my Special Representative for Somalia regularly consulted the President, the Prime Minister and other stakeholders on the constitution-making process, the policy for newly recovered areas and the parliamentary dispute. He also enhanced cooperation with AMISOM. My Special Representative has communicated regularly with the Somali leadership and engaged locally with the media to improve dissemination of information.

18. A number of high-level meetings during the reporting period highlighted commitment to ending the transition in August, as well as the need to engage in recovered areas, and to take collective action against spoilers. For example, on 27 January, a summit of Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) endorsed the grand stabilization strategy for south and central Somalia presented by the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation.

19. On 5 and 6 February in Djibouti, the International Contact Group on Somalia reiterated its commitment to peace and stability in the country, and reaffirmed that the transition must end on 20 August 2012. Participants expressed serious concern about the parliamentary stalemate. The Group discussed various options to reform its working methods. On 23 February, the London Conference on Somalia brought together over 50 countries and organizations in support of the peace process. Both the International Contact Group on Somalia and the London Conference highlighted the need for action against spoilers of the peace process. The conclusions of the London Conference were welcomed by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 5 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/4).

C. Targeted sanctions

20. On 3 February, the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea provided the midterm briefing to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea. He pointed out that, in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Group had identified cases where the activities of prominent political and commercial leaders

significantly undermined the ability of the transitional federal institutions to effectively carry out core State functions and prevented them from completing transitional tasks.

21. On 17 February, further to a decision of the Committee, Ali Ahmed Nur Jim'ale was added to the list of individuals and entities subject to the travel ban, assets freeze and targeted arms embargo imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolution 1844 (2008). (Mr. Jim'ale was de-listed on the same date by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.)

D. Other political developments

22. Relations between "Somaliland" and "Puntland" remained strained. On 19 January, Dhulbahante clan leaders and politicians from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn announced the formation of a new administration, called "Khaatumo State". Sool and Sanaag regions are claimed by both "Puntland" and "Somaliland", whose forces continued to clash over the control of towns and villages. This resulted in displacement and intensified clan wars over grazing, water and other natural resources. Demonstrations were held in support of the new administration, demanding the withdrawal of "Somaliland" troops from Laascaanood.

23. "Somaliland" adopted a law on 5 February to overturn a constitutional ban on participating in international conferences on Somalia. The timing paved the way for "Somaliland's" participation at the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February.

24. On 18 April, the Constitutional Convention of "Puntland" approved the Transitional Constitution of "Puntland" by a large majority. The Constitution allows extension of the currently serving administration for one year while providing for future multi-party elections. The President of "Puntland", Abdirahman Farole, called on other regions of Somalia to follow "Puntland's" example and form State administrations under a federal Somalia.

25. In February, the Transitional Federal Government filed an application to join the East African Community.

III. Security

26. The security situation remained volatile as military operations continued on the outskirts of Mogadishu and parts of south-central Somalia. Gains against the insurgency continued, although the period also saw an increasing number of non-conventional attacks by Al-Shabaab. Implementation of resolution 2036 (2012) commenced swiftly and support to the Somali security sector has made progress.

A. Security situation

27. In the Mogadishu area, Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained constant, though many were prevented or failed as pressure mounted from reinforced Government and AMISOM forces. The threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism was heightened by a public statement against UNPOS on 25 January and, more significantly, the

announcement on 9 February of a strengthened alliance with Al-Qaida. Some elements of Al-Shabaab reportedly do not embrace the alliance. The United Nations was directly targeted in three hand grenade attacks against its sites in January, without casualties. Attacks on Villa Somalia, the presidential compound, were carried out on 14 March by an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber and on 19, 20 and 26 March with the firing of mortar rounds, claiming several lives. On 4 April, another Al-Shabaab suicide bomber set off an explosion at the National Theatre of Mogadishu, killing 10 people, including several officials of the Transitional Federal Government.

28. In central Somalia, Ethiopian troops concentrated heavy combat elements around the border towns of Luuq and Dolo in January, and launched an offensive into Bay Region on 18 February, forcing Al-Shabaab out of key strongholds, including the town of Baidoa. Ethiopian troops led the capture of Beledweyne, Xuddur and Ceel Buur. In southern Somalia, despite numerous air strikes in Juba Dhexe and Juba Hoose, military advances were hindered by continuing insurgent hit-and-run attacks.

29. The dispute between "Somaliland" and the newly proclaimed "Khaatumo State", in addition to clan-related violence, resulted in fatal clashes in Buuhoodle and Sool. While Al-Shabaab continued to lose ground in south-central Somalia, there were reports of it strengthening its alliance with militias in the Galgala mountain area in "Puntland". Insurgents reportedly aligned with Al-Shabaab clashed with local authorities. "Puntland's" security situation was also characterized by renewed hostility against foreign involvement in the exploitation of natural resources.

B. Progress towards the full deployment and strengthening of the African Union Mission in Somalia

30. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), the United Nations held consultations with the African Union and AMISOM to discuss the implementation of the resolution and the revised concept of operations, including the delivery of the expanded United Nations logistical support package for AMISOM. The United Nations Office to the African Union, with the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), supported the African Union Commission's development of AMISOM operational benchmarks to monitor the implementation of resolution 2036 (2012).

31. The African Union report of 20 March (see S/2012/176), pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2036 (2012), details the current AMISOM strength and future deployment plans, and the progress made in implementing the resolution. A key benchmark was met with the establishment of the Military Operations Coordination Committee, which held its first two meetings on 9 and 30 March, with the support of the United Nations Office to the African Union. In addition, a combined meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee and the Joint Coordination Mechanism, a strategic consultative body consisting of Ministers of Defence, was held in Addis Ababa on 12 April. The meetings operationalized the strategic coordination mechanism of the AMISOM strategic concept and reviewed the structure of the enhanced force headquarters to conduct expanded and multi-sector AMISOM operations.

32. The joint African Union-United Nations planning team continued to develop the remaining key operational documents, including through visits to Mogadishu and Baidoa and predeployment visits to troop- and police-contributing countries. Memorandums of understanding and letters of assist are being finalized to ensure support to AMISOM troops in Sectors 2, 3 and 4 through Kenya and Ethiopia.

33. In Mogadishu (Sector 1), UNSOA focused its efforts on establishing a permanent camp in the north-east of the city. Fuel, water and ration distribution points are in place to reduce the logistic resupply time to the forward troops. Phase 1 of the infrastructure for AMISOM headquarters is almost complete, and other facilities are due for completion by August 2012. Medical clinic infrastructure is complete with equipment installed. UNSOA conducted 23 medical evacuation, transfer and repatriation flights from Mogadishu for a total of 62 AMISOM personnel from 1 December 2011 to 15 April 2012.

34. Planning for support in other sectors is ongoing, and designs for logistic hubs have been finalized. Additional equipment and vehicles are being requisitioned to ensure support to AMISOM troops and their deployment outside Mogadishu. Reconnaissance of potential transportation routes and airfields to support Sectors 2 and 3 was completed. Planning for deployment to Sector 3 is complete. As the first deployment of AMISOM outside Mogadishu, an advance party of 100 Burundian and Ugandan troops arrived in Baidoa on 5 April 2012. Planning for the deployment of Djiboutian troops to Beledweyne in Sector 4 is at an advanced stage. On 7 April, UNSOA shipped contingent-owned equipment and basic life support items from Mogadishu to Djibouti for prepositioning.

35. AMISOM troops continued to improve freedom of movement in Mogadishu through the disposal of landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. From 9 December 2011 to 31 March, 1,098 items of unexploded ordnance and 48 improvised explosive devices were destroyed. As AMISOM troops rotated into the city, training in explosive ordnance disposal was provided by the United Nations for about 100 Burundian and Ugandan troops. The Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations supported the deployment of the force in the new sectors, which requires explosive ordnance disposal capacities to mitigate explosive threats and meet mobility requirements.

36. Capacity-building remains a priority for UNSOA, particularly in the context of expanded operations. Predeployment training, including on human rights, conduct and discipline, as well as gender awareness and sexual exploitation, was conducted for the third time in Bujumbura on 19 and 20 January for 25 incoming Burundian officers. Initiated in November 2011, the joint UNPOS-UNSOA training package has been provided to 101 Burundian and Ugandan officers.

37. UNSOA communication activities continued to positively affect the profile of AMISOM and contributed to marginalizing Al-Shabaab. Recent public opinion polling in Mogadishu demonstrates an increasingly favourable trend in public perception and approval of AMISOM, the transitional federal institutions and the international community. The African Union-United Nations Information Support Team was reinforced to ensure support across the sectors. Work continued on the expansion of the Radio Bar-Kulan transmission network, and on the establishment of a Somali public service radio broadcaster.

C. Strengthening of the Somali security institutions

38. Somali forces will figure prominently in the expanded AMISOM operations, but they still suffer from limited supply and logistic capabilities. On 30 March, following the meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee, the African Union Commission convened a consultative meeting on Somalia security sector empowerment in Addis Ababa, with the aim of facilitating resource mobilization for the Somali security forces. Subsequently, the African Union Commission established a working group, which held its first meeting in Addis Ababa on 11 April, to ensure appropriate follow-up to the meeting of 30 March in coordination with the United Nations.

Planning and strategic guidance

39. Four Somali diaspora security and defence policy experts hired by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began work to support a functional national security and stabilization plan secretariat, working alongside the secretariat of the Joint Security Committee. UNPOS deployed a consultant to Mogadishu on 9 March to support the development and establishment of regional and district security committees. Three Somali policy advisers recruited by UNPOS joined the Ministry of the Interior and National Security to support the Somali police force in crime reduction, planning and rehabilitation, as well as the establishment of the committees in recovered areas in Mogadishu, to ensure the participation of local communities in violence- and crime-mitigating measures.

40. To improve transparency in stipend payments to the police and military, the United Nations and concerned Member States continued to support the Government in registering personnel through a biometrical system. At the end of the reporting period, the database contained 7,658 military and police personnel.

Military

41. Early in March, the Chief of Defence Forces formed a Coordination Committee to manage the implementation of national security force activities delivered as part of the road map and the National Security and Stabilization Plan.

42. Under the Joint Security Committee, the United Nations established a Military Training Committee to prioritize, plan and coordinate training of the national security forces. The Committee requested the United States and the European Union Training Mission to train 600 troops from Somalia's regions at a forthcoming course in Uganda in June 2012. The newly refurbished Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu has been operational since January, and over 700 troops are currently undergoing training.

43. Military capacity-building remains constrained by limited ability to pay and equip operational troops, as well as by the existence of many non-operational troops on the payroll. Donor-funded stipends for the military are required on an increasing and sustainable basis, while donor funding is also required for a veterans and/or civil service pension scheme to address the needs of the wounded and aged.

Police

44. Police stipends are six months in arrears. With support from Japan, the United Nations and AMISOM completed payment for 1,314 Somali police officers who took a refresher course early in 2011 at the Mogadishu Police Academy. The United Nations is working to secure funds to cover the arrears from October 2011 to date. UNPOS, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and AMISOM already initiated payments for the period from March to September 2011 for 5,370 eligible Somali police officers. With funding from the Government of Japan, procurement is being finalized for 19 vehicles, including personnel carriers, ambulances and pick-up trucks, for the Somali police force. Sixty senior Somali police force personnel, including 17 women, underwent training in December 2011 in Mogadishu to strengthen managerial skills and competencies.

Mine action

45. Three police explosive ordnance disposal teams responded to 116 call-outs, identifying and securing 600 explosive items and preventing death or injury to civilians and police officers. The teams were trained in the dissemination of explosive threat awareness messages and conducted outreach for the first time, providing life-saving information for 1,400 street cleaners, many of whom come in contact with explosive devices in their work. A team deployed to Baidoa during the third week of March and is assisting with preliminary survey and clearance of explosive items.

Justice and corrections

46. The Justice and Corrections Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee held its inaugural meeting on 23 February and adopted the draft national justice and corrections plan. In March, the Transitional Federal Government appointed the first woman judge to the Judicial Services Council. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNPOS and UNICEF conducted an assessment of the Government's correction system, and UNPOS conducted two monitoring visits to Mogadishu Central Prison. Rehabilitation of the Benadir court compound in Mogadishu was completed. UNPOS supported Somali law professors in developing a curriculum for judicial training across the country.

47. On 1 March, the High Judicial Council of "Somaliland" appointed 10 new Deputy Attorneys General. For the first time, five appointees were women. New courts, including the Regional and District Courts of Hargeysa, in "Somaliland", constructed with United Nations support, were handed over to the authorities on 10 December. The final phase of a substantial rebuilding of Boosaaso prison is under way, as is construction of a prison academy, prison service headquarters and the new Ministry of Justice in Garoowe. By early 2012, 30 per cent of all "Puntland" judges had undergone the United Nations-sponsored legal and human rights training.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

48. While the prerequisites for a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are still lacking in Somalia, the number of fighters who defected from the Somali insurgent groups has decreased and is currently slightly over 500. The National Security Agency established a "profiling" mechanism to

manage disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants. An inter-agency workshop on 17 and 18 March in Mogadishu helped to clarify roles and responsibilities in support of disengaging fighters. This support and planning for a future programme are part of the cooperation agreement between UNPOS and IOM signed on 1 February 2012. Meanwhile UNDP launched six-month skills training programmes for 1,390 youths at risk of violence in Burao, Gaalkacyo and Boosaaso.

D. Piracy

49. Since my last regular report, the number of hostages and ships held has remained almost steady: currently 291 hostages from 16 ships are held, according to the International Maritime Organization. Although successful attacks declined from 55 in 2010 to 33 in 2011, attempted attacks in the high-risk area increased from 174 in 2010 to 287 in 2011. Piracy off the coast of Somalia remains an entrenched criminal enterprise with a growing geographical area of operations, larger-scale attacks, increased levels of violence and higher ransoms. With a view to increasing the rate of prosecution for these illegal activities, my two most recent reports (S/2011/360 and S/2012/50) explored the modalities for the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in the region.

50. In February, "Somaliland" adopted legislation recognizing piracy as a crime and allowing for pirates convicted abroad to be transferred to its prisons. "Somaliland" agreed to receive 19 Somali pirates convicted by the Seychelles.

51. On 29 March, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia held its eleventh meeting in New York under the chairmanship of the United Arab Emirates. It noted that piracy can be eliminated only by combining counter-piracy activities with wider efforts at stabilizing Somalia, promoting good governance and rule of law, strengthening the institutions of the Transitional Federal Government and fostering socio-economic development. The previous day, the Board of the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia approved two new projects worth US$ 1.37 million. The projects will support piracy trials in Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania, and will provide further assistance for the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme.

IV. Humanitarian, recovery and development, and human rights situations

52. Although the massive scaling-up in humanitarian assistance combined with a good harvest lifted Somalia out of famine in January 2012, malnutrition and mortality rates remain exceptionally high. Hundreds of internally displaced persons spontaneously returned from Mogadishu to their places of origin. By the end of March, the 2012 Consolidated Appeal Process was only 21 per cent funded. The United Nations continued to implement the Somali assistance strategy and reported progress in social services, poverty reduction and livelihoods and good governance. In Mogadishu, a lack of funding prevented the adoption of a strategic and prioritized approach to stabilization activities. The number of reports of sexual violence increased.

A. Humanitarian situation

53. On 3 February, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network announced that the combination of the massive increase in humanitarian assistance and an exceptional harvest in December and January had lifted Somalia out of famine. Nonetheless, an estimated 2.51 million Somalis, over one third of the population, still need life-saving assistance. Malnutrition rates in the country are among the highest in the world: one in five children in the south of the country are malnourished. Mortality rates remain above emergency thresholds.

54. Access to the southern regions, home to nearly 72 per cent of the people in crisis, remains a key challenge. The ban imposed by Al-Shabaab on 6 United Nations agencies and 10 non-governmental organizations in areas under its control in November 2011 continues. Since the end of January, two more humanitarian organizations have been banned by Al-Shabaab from operating in areas under its control.

55. Displacement rates remained high: 140,000 displacements were reported in the first quarter of the year. Tens of thousands of people fled internally displaced person settlements in the Afgooye Corridor as fighting erupted in the outskirts of Mogadishu in mid-February. Afgooye has the highest concentration of internally displaced persons in the world, with 410,000 Somalis living along a 16-km stretch of road. The total number of internally displaced persons in Somalia is 1.4 million.

56. Humanitarian actors in Somalia have appealed for US$ 1.5 billion for 2012. At the end of March, the appeal was only 21 per cent funded. It may be challenging for the humanitarian community to raise these funds and deliver on commitments given the continuing restrictions on humanitarian access in the south. The humanitarian country team is reviewing the Somalia appeal to ensure that the changing situation on the ground is accurately reflected.

Humanitarian activities

57. The scaling-up in humanitarian response that started in the third quarter of 2011 continued. In January and February 2012, the World Food Programme provided over 20,000 tons of food to almost 1.5 million beneficiaries.

58. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees worked with partners to contribute to the creation of conducive conditions for the spontaneous returns of internally displaced persons to south-central Somalia. It also provided return packages and agricultural inputs, together with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), to increase the resilience of returnees.

59. UNICEF helped almost 520,000 people to gain access to safe water systems. In addition, 86,000 malnourished children were assisted across Somalia, 13,000 households, including 20,000 children under age 5, received three hot meals daily and 15,000 families received monthly food rations.

60. As a response to the high number of diseases with outbreak potential, several preventive emergency vaccination campaigns were completed, in the accessible regions of southern and central Somalia.

B. Economic, recovery and development activities

61. Improved security in Somalia has led to increased economic activities. Turkish Airlines commenced twice-weekly flights to Mogadishu from Istanbul on 6 March and the Somali National Theatre reopened on 19 March. The United Nations access to parts of south-central Somalia increased and initial missions were fielded to re-establish offices and relocate national and international staff to regions of south-central Somalia.

62. The exchange rate of the Somali shilling fluctuated extensively alongside reports of the introduction of new bank notes in March. The Transitional Federal Government continued to advocate with international partners for implementation of the charcoal export ban authorized in Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), which is expected to further weaken the Al-Shabaab insurgency.

63. After many years of inactivity, in January 2012 "Puntland" launched the exploration of two oil wells in a joint venture with private companies in the "Dharoor" block in Bari Region. The estimated prospective reserves from the area were reported to exceed 300 million barrels of oil.

64. The United Nations country team continued to implement the Somali assistance strategy. Under the social services outcome of the strategy, the World Health Organization initiated field hospitals in Dollow and Dhoobley. Under the poverty reduction and livelihoods outcome, in south-central Somalia, FAO distributed 1,600 tons of maize seed, 900 tons of sorghum seed and 120 tons of sesame seed among 95,000 households. In a welcome development, "Puntland's" Cabinet and Parliament adopted a fisheries regulation and policy, opening the way to further development of the fisheries sector.

C. Stabilization and recovery efforts in Mogadishu

65. More than 10 United Nations entities are working on stabilization projects throughout Mogadishu, but work is hampered by lack of funds. Approximately $3 million were allocated to stabilization efforts in Mogadishu in 2011, compared to the $15 million required for phase 1 of the Mogadishu recovery and stabilization strategy. In the reporting period, the United Nations continued to focus on security improvements in Mogadishu, working with the Somali police force to expand the presence of the force to priority locations, including the Badbado Camp for displaced persons. The United Nations also deployed a police liaison officer as focal point for humanitarian agencies, who is dealing with incident reporting, including gender-based violence, and facilitating investigations and arrests.

66. Early in 2012, a joint United Nations initiative on "youth at risk" rolled out a female community policing initiative in five districts of Mogadishu. Five hundred women are now serving as voluntary community patrol officers. In addition, the United Nations provided literacy and numeracy training to 484 "youth at risk" in Mogadishu, and 350 others received vocational training. The United Nations also delivered conflict management, gender in local governance and local leadership training to 480 local leaders, district authority staff and civil society representatives.

67. IOM completed a waste management project that provided three months of employment to 800 vulnerable persons, 85 per cent of them women. In March, in

collaboration with the Benadir regional administration, IOM launched a short-term cash-for-work project for 500 youths.

D. Human rights and protection of civilians

68. In Mogadishu, the number of weapon-related injuries remained high: more than 1,200 casualties were treated between December 2011 and February 2012, many due to Al-Shabaab's use of improvised explosive devices. Civilian casualties, as well as displacement, were reported in the context of Kenyan and Ethiopian supported security operations. Reports were received of targeted killings by Al-Shabaab of persons associated with the Transitional Federal Government in the newly recovered areas.

69. In Mogadishu, evictions by the Transitional Federal Government from public buildings resulted in homelessness. Guidelines on evictions were made available to the Government and efforts are under way to develop a strategy to address issues of internally displaced persons.

70. Rape and sexual violence against internally displaced women and girls continues to be reported. Survivors identified perpetrators as Transitional Federal Government soldiers and armed groups. Under the auspices of the Prime Minister, a Task Force on Gender-based Violence was established in December 2011, to which the United Nations has been invited. The Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on violence against women conducted her first visit to Somalia in December 2011. She stressed the urgent need for educational and legal measures to prevent and punish violence against women.

71. My Special Representative called for a full and independent investigation into the assassination of three journalists in Mogadishu and a fourth in "Puntland". Separately, he expressed concern at undue restrictions, such as the arrest and detention of 21 journalists in "Somaliland", and called on the Somali authorities to respect freedom of opinion and expression in the political process.

72. In "Puntland", legislation established the Office of the Human Rights Defender, but the position remains unfilled. Arrest and detention of youths from southern Somalia suspected of links with Al-Shabaab continued. New legislation legalizing forms of female genital mutilation represented a regression in the protection of women's rights. It is expected that the final draft Constitution will prohibit the practice of female genital mutilation, as the current Somali-language draft outlaws only pharaonic circumcision.

73. On 23 March, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution encouraging the implementation of the memorandum of understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Transitional Federal Government, and requested me to submit a report containing concrete proposals for a more integrated approach across the United Nations system to protect and promote human rights in Somalia.

E. Child protection

74. The United Nations continued to document cases of grave violations against children. Of particular concern is a pattern of children becoming victims of direct

attacks and cross-fire as a result of the intensified military activities against Al-Shabaab. The country task force made progress in following up on commitments made by the Transitional Federal Government during the visit of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in November 2011. The Government announced on 7 January the introduction of strict measures to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers. It emphasized its readiness to enter into dialogue for the preparation and implementation of time-bound action plans within the framework of Security Council resolutions 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009). A workshop organized by the Transitional Federal Government and the United Nations on 6 and 7 March in Mogadishu developed a draft action plan on the release and reintegration of child soldiers from Government armed forces.

F. Women and peace and security

75. Work continued to ensure implementation of the Garoowe process commitment to ensure that at least 30 per cent of seats in the Constituent Assembly and the new Federal Parliament are earmarked for women. This was a key recommendation from the gender workshop held in early December 2011 with women from the Transitional Federal Government, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, "Puntland" and "Galmudug". During consultations with my Special Representative on 12 March, a cross-section of influential women requested support in setting up a consultative body to ensure that the selection of women candidates would not be compromised.

76. Following efforts to have women engaged in all committees and consultative meetings, the revised structure of the Joint Security Committee adopted in January now includes the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs in its membership. On 18 January, the Office of the Prime Minster announced the appointment of four women to the Anti-Corruption Commission.

V. Coordination

A. United Nations presence and coordinated approach in Somalia

77. The initial deployment of UNPOS is now complete. As at 15 April, UNPOS had deployed 38 personnel inside Somalia, both national and international: 12 in Mogadishu, 12 in Hargeysa, and 14 in Garoowe. UNPOS staff in Mogadishu work and live in prefabricated containers and rely on UNSOA and Mine Action Service arrangements for full life support functions. Additional staff will deploy in the coming months, upon availability of additional office and living accommodation and logistics support, and depending on the security conditions.

78. The second progress report for the integrated strategic framework was completed for the period from September 2011 to January 2012. The report confirmed progress on the security sector objective, including providing support to district security committees and ensuring human rights training for Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces, as well as on the economic development and livelihoods objective. The Senior Policy Group met regularly to address issues related to the coherence of political, security and humanitarian aspects of the United Nations effort in Somalia.

79. On 24 January 2012, the agreement between the United Nations and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia concerning the status of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia was signed in Mogadishu by my Special Representative and the Prime Minister. The status of mission agreement entered into force immediately upon signature, setting out the privileges, immunities and facilities, exemptions and rights accorded to UNPOS and its personnel to effectively fulfil its mandate in Somalia.

B. Cooperation among the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union and the United Nations

80. The United Nations continued to work closely with the African Union and IGAD in support of the Somalia peace process. In the reporting period, the focus was on ensuring coordination of the various strategies for stabilization of newly recovered areas beyond Mogadishu, through joint assessments and improved coordination. The methodology and assessment frameworks used ensured a coordinated analytical approach.

VI. Resource mobilization

81. A comprehensive mapping of the resource needs for the implementation of the road map, particularly concentrating on the constitutional and parliamentary processes, has been presented to donors in Nairobi. The total requirements are estimated at $17.5 million, of which there is a funding gap of $12 million. The coming months leading to the end of the transition period in August are the most critical. Dire funding gaps could jeopardize the limited by significant the limited but significant gains made thus far. Very urgent action is required by donors to ensure that timely and effective action can be taken.

82. The United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM received three "uncaveated" contributions since my last report: $4,374,799 from Denmark, $260,247 from Sweden and £16 million from the United Kingdom. The newly received funds will pay arrears in reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment and other support to AMISOM troops.

83. The uncommitted balance of the Trust Fund for Peacebuilding in Somalia stands at just $30,000 after extensive outlays to secure the Garoowe I and II meetings. The fund received €40,000 from Italy for the implementation of the road map and $171,000 from UNDP to support the Garoowe II conference.

84. The Trust Fund in Support of the Somali Security Institutions has an uncommitted balance of $382,000. Since my last report, the United Nations and the United Kingdom signed agreements for support amounting to £260,000 for the secretariat of the Joint Security Committee and £150,000 to commence funding the maritime security coordination office.

85. Since its inception, in January 2010, the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has received about $12 million in contributions and has disbursed $10 million.

VII. Observations

86. Four months ahead of the deadline for the end of the transition, Somalia's progress towards peace faces considerable challenges. But there is a real opportunity, which must be seized, to move the country to a new phase in the political process. For that to happen, Somali leaders must unite in the commitment to ending the transition in August. They must agree to move forward together and to carefully listen to the views of the Somali people. Only in this way will they effectively address the challenges ahead and successfully end the transition.

87. Somalia's new interim Constitution will create a framework for all Somalis to take part in political life. Approval by the Constituent Assembly of the interim Constitution will be the beginning not the end, of a process. Some questions, around the nature of federalism and the role of sharia, are likely to need further discussion after the end of the transition and before a public referendum. However, the draft put to the Assembly must form a strong basis on which to move forward. It should reflect the wishes of the Somali people, expressed in consultations over the past months, as well as fundamental principles of human rights. I urge the Somali leadership in their review of the draft Constitution to represent faithfully the views of their constituencies, to share the draft with the public and to conduct vigorous civic education in the remaining period before it is submitted to the Constituent Assembly for provisional adoption.

88. The Constituent Assembly is a fundamental requirement of the road map. For the sake of Somalia's future, it is essential to get the Assembly's composition, structure and modus operandi right. Traditional leaders will play a central role in the selection of its members. It is crucial that Somali grass-roots communities and civil society organizations fully participate in this selection process, so as to make it as inclusive and transparent as possible. I strongly urge donors to help Somalis to raise the significant financial, logistical and security resources needed to establish and operationalize the Constituent Assembly immediately.

89. Creating the legal basis for the Constituent Assembly's work is equally important. In this regard, the political impasse in the Transitional Federal Parliament is a major impediment to moving the political process forward. Those Members of Parliament who delay or obstruct the political process should be put on notice that their actions will have consequences. While my Special Representative, together with senior representatives of the African Union and others, has spared no effort to resolve the dispute between the two sides, legislation and other tasks critical to the implementation of the road map remain blocked. The Security Council has appealed to the Somali leaders and parliamentarians to rise to the challenge, put the interest of the Somali nation above all else and resolve the impasse amicably. In the absence of such progress, the time has come to look at alternative ways of establishing a legal basis for ending the transition.

90. To address those who obstruct the political process, both within and outside the transitional federal institutions, strong measures must be implemented. These would be graduated measures, beginning with a warning, followed by naming and shaming and, if no progress is made, action by the Security Council. I encourage Member States and subregional organizations such as IGAD to examine the scope for punitive measures such as travel bans and the freezing of assets. Meanwhile, it should also be noted that there are some parliamentarians who have performed their

duties honourably and deserve a severance package that recognizes their service. I encourage Member States to consider such a package.

91. The extension of security across the country is critical to the success of the peace process. I am encouraged by the steady progress in the expansion of AMISOM authorized in resolution 2036 (2012) and commend AMISOM for deploying beyond Mogadishu for the first time since its establishment. The strong partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has been further consolidated in the implementation phase. I welcome the plans of the African Union and troop-contributing countries to complete the expanded deployment, including the development of operational benchmarks. The United Nations will support the African Union in achieving these benchmarks, including the rehatting of Kenyan forces in Sector 2 and the deployment in Sector 3.

92. I welcome the increased role of AMISOM in enhancing the effectiveness of the Somali forces, as well as the continuing contribution of the European Union Training Mission. I encourage Member States to support the force's immediate requirements and welcome the efforts of the African Union to identify practical requirements, in coordination with the United Nations, at the meeting on Somalia security sector empowerment on 30 March. At the same time, there is a need for a long-term approach to building sustainable and credible local security institutions. I urge Somali stakeholders to thoroughly consider what security architecture best fits the country's future system of governance. I welcome the recent progress of the Joint Security Committee in discussing critical questions such as the integration of Somalia's armed forces, the development of civilian police and justice systems, and the development of programmes for demobilized combatants. Further advances will be contingent upon additional resources.

93. While Somali forces and AMISOM continue to make territorial gains, asymmetric insurgent attacks pose a substantial threat. In this regard, I encourage Member States with the necessary capabilities to assist AMISOM and Somali forces to build their capacity to prevent asymmetric attacks and to improve civilian security. I welcome the recent moves of the African Union to establish the guard force mandated in resolution 2010 (2011), which is vital to support safe movement of international civilians in Mogadishu.

94. I remain deeply concerned about grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, especially against women and children. I urge all parties to ensure that the protection of civilians is integrated into all military operations. I am encouraged by the Transitional Federal Government's continued commitment to prevent the recruitment and use of children by its armed forces and request it to finalize the drafting of the action plan, and begin implementation, before the end of the transition.

95. The humanitarian situation in Somalia requires continued attention and support. Poor rainfall predictions underline that current progress is both fragile and reversible. I urge all actors to ensure unconditional access for humanitarian workers so that vulnerable people can be reached. I also encourage all donors to urgently support the Consolidated Appeal Process, currently only 21 per cent funded.

96. Stabilization of areas recently recovered from the insurgency requires an integrated national and international effort. It requires local administrations, supported by the majority of the local community, to provide security, basic social

services, and an environment conducive to private sector development. In this regard, I welcome the strategy adopted by the Transitional Federal Government. I urge international partners to ensure that their assistance is coordinated with the government's efforts and conforms to the Principles for international support to local areas of stability in Somalia agreed at the London Conference on 23 February. To this end, I welcome current efforts to strengthen coordination among AMISOM, IGAD and the United Nations.

97. The end of the transition should encourage the international community to invest seriously in the long-term recovery and development of Somalia. As a first step, I encourage donors to support the unfunded balance of the Mogadishu Stabilization and Recovery Plan. The forthcoming "Istanbul II" conference, to be hosted by the Government of Turkey on 31 May and 1 June, offers an important opportunity for Somali and international partners to develop joint approaches, to areas such as the rehabilitation of roads, energy and water supply, and building community resilience to humanitarian crises, that will visibly improve the standard of living of Somalis. This will also be an opportunity for the international community to look at priorities for support in the post-transition period, bearing in mind that Somalia will need significant support to develop and implement the interim Constitution, build governance institutions, empower regional administrations, strengthen the security sector and prepare for elections.

98. In the long run, Somalia is responsible for its own peace, stability, development and prosperity. As State authority is extended over a wider area, the Government must put in place regulatory frameworks that protect property rights and investments, and enable the growth of enterprise. I hope the Istanbul conference will provide a platform for developing initiatives in this regard with the support of the World Bank and other relevant international partners. Responsible fiscal and monetary policies will also be critical. I urge the Transitional Federal Government and the regional authorities to raise and manage their own revenues transparently in accordance with national legislation. Crucial monetary policy issues, such as issuing new notes, should be made public in the *Official Bulletin*.

99. I pay tribute to AMISOM, the Government forces and its allies, as well as the regional forces operating inside Somalia for the continuing sacrifice and commitment to bring peace and stability in the country. I also express my gratitude to my Special Representative for his commitment to advancing peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. I would also like to acknowledge the dedication of the men and women serving with the United Nations and its partner organizations, often under difficult conditions.

Annex I

Garoowe I Principles

Agreed at the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference held from 21 to 23 December 2011

1. The first national constitutional conference was held in Garowe from 21-23 December, 2011. The meeting was convened by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and hosted by Puntland State Government of Somalia and facilitated by the United Nations, under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia.

2. The meeting brought together the signatories of the Roadmap and members of Civil Society. Among the dignitaries present were H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Honorable Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), H.E. Professor Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Prime Minister of TFG, H.E Dr Abbdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud, the President of Puntland, H.E. Mohamed Ahmed Alin, President of Galmudug, Sheikh Mohamed Mohamoud Yusuf, Representative of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ). The meeting was opened by the host, H.E Dr Abbdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud, the President of Puntland, who highlighted the need to end the transition by pointing to the urgency to implement the Roadmap.

3. The meeting identified two principal issues requiring consideration by the delegates in light of the current political climate and the necessity of timely implementation of the Roadmap:

- The structure, size, as well as the basis of representation and the selection criteria of the new federal parliament under the new federal constitution;

- Adoption of the new federal constitution by a constituent assembly, including, the mandate, size and the selection criteria of the members of the constituent assembly together with the selection of the new parliamentarians.

4. Whereas the Participants have considered the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord and the Roadmap; whereas the Signitories reaffirm the unity of the Somali people, the political independence and territorial integrity of the Somali nation, the following principles were agreed by the delegates and signatories of the Roadmap. These principles, henceforth to be referred to as ***The Garowe Principles***, shall guide and direct finalization of the draft constitution and the process of ending the transition.

The Garowe Principles on the Finalization and Adoption of the Constitution and the End of the Transition

1. **National Constituent Assembly**
   a. The Final Draft of the Somali Federal Constitution shall be completed no later than 20 April 2012.

b. A National Constituent Assembly shall provisionally adopt the Draft Federal Constitution as the Provisional Constitution of Somalia, subject to a Constitutional Implementation Review Process and National Referendum as circumstances permit.
c. The National Constituent Assembly shall be nominated by all Roadmap signatories and civil society based on the 4.5 formula.
d. The National Constituent Assembly shall consist of a Maximum of 1,000 Delegates of which 30% shall be women.
e. The Committee of Experts shall review the Constitution and ensure that the power relationships between the states and the federal government are enumerated and the new Somali Federal Constitution shall be harmonized with existing state constitutions.
f. The Committee of Experts shall hand over the final draft of the Somali Federal Constitution to the Independent Federal Constitution Commission no later than 5 May 2012.
g. The National Constituent Assembly shall convene and commence its proceedings no later than 15 May 2012.
h. The National Constituent Assembly shall adopt the Provisional Federal Constitution by way of a yes or no vote no later than May 22, 2012.
i. The National Constituent Assembly shall be dissolved on May 30, 2012.

2. Post-transition Parliamentary Structure

a. A bicameral federal legislature shall be established commencing on the 21st of August, 2012 and shall serve the first term of the parliament established in June 2012 under this agreement and the new Federal Constitution. The upper chamber of the bicameral legislature shall comprise of members of federal states and regional administrations.
b. The new Somali Federal Parliament shall comprise of 225 members of Parliament, with 20% women members.
c. The new federal parliament shall comprise of all communities, regions and existing states of the federal Somalia and shall reflect the diversity of Somali communities.
    i. Since the prevailing security situation will not permit direct elections, it is agreed that the lower house of the new federal parliament will be selected on the basis of the 4.5 formula of representation for this selection process only and shall prevail only for the term of parliament proposed under this agreement.
    ii. The 4.5 formula shall never become the basis for power sharing in any future political dispensation after the above mentioned term concludes.
    iii. The new Federal Constitution shall not include any provisions using the 4.5 formula and shall not be amended to abrogate this stipulation in any manner.
    iv. The new federal parliament that comes into being in June 2012 shall not amend or enact any law or implement any

policy that takes into account or attempts to reinstate the 4.5 power sharing formula.

v. After the first term, the parliament will be elected through universal polling of one person one vote.

vi. In case the prevailing situation does not allow for universal polling, the parliament will be selected on the basis of constituencies.

d. The term of the new federal parliament under the new federal constitution shall be four years. The mandate of the new parliament and the new government shall include the preparation of the country for a referendum and general elections, starting with municipal, local elections and culminating in a general national election.

e. Members of the new federal parliament will be nominated by recognized traditional elders assisted by qualified civil society members none of whom shall not have any political aspirations.

i. An 15-member Independent Interim Electoral Commission consisting of representatives from Somali stakeholders shall evaluate and approve all nominees.

ii. Where there are existing State administrations, the state administrations will nominate their delegates and submit the list to Independent Interim Electoral Commission.

f. The new Somali Federal Parliament shall be sworn-in on 15 June 2012.

g. Elections for the Parliament Speaker and his or her Deputies shall take place on 20 July 2012, to be followed elections for the President on 20 August 2012.

Whereas, the Signatories respect the independence of the Parliament as the legislative body.

Whereas, the Parliament in turn is urged to respect the Kampala Accord, and should not take any action that violates the Kampala Accord.

Further, the Signatories request the International Community to take action against any elements that bring forth frivolous and capricious motions against the President, Prime Minister, Speaker and the two Deputy Speakers designed to derail the implementation of the Roadmap.

The Signatories announce that the next Constitutional Consultative Conference will be held in Garowe in the third week of January 2012 and will focus on the finalization and adoption of federalism.



Signatories:

1. Transitional Federal Government
   President of the Transitional Federal Government
   Hon. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
   _____ 24-12-2011

2. Transitional Federal Parliament
   Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament
   Hon. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden
   _____

3. Transitional Federal Government
   Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
   Hon. Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali
   _____ 24-12-2011

4. Puntland
   President of Puntland
   Dr. Abdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud
   _____ 24-12-2011

5. Galmudug
   President of Galmudug
   Mohamed Ahmed Aalim
   _____ 24-12-2011

6. Ahlu-Sunna Wal Jamaaca
   Representative of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaaca
   Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud Yusuf
   _____ 24/12/2011

7. Deputy Special Representative of the
   Secretary General of the UN for Somalia
   Christian Manahl
   _____ 24/12/2011

Annex II

Garoowe II Principles

Agreed at the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference held from 15 to 17 February 2012

1. The second national constitutional conference was held in Garowe from 15 – 17 February, 2012. The meeting was convened by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and hosted by Puntland State Government of Somalia and facilitated by the United Nations, under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia.

2. The meeting brought together the signatories of the Roadmap and members of Civil Society. Among the dignitaries present were (H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),) Honorable Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), H.E. Professor Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Prime Minister of TFG, H.E Dr Abbdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud, the President of Puntland, H.E. Mohamed Ahmed Alin, President of Galmudug, Khalif Abdulkadir Moallin Noor, Representative of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ). The meeting was opened by Hon Sharif Hassan, the speaker of the parliament who underscored the need to agree several principle cornerstones on the completion of the constitutional process.

3. At the conclusion of Garowe I, the Signatories announced that the next Constitutional Consultative Conference would be held in Garowe in early 2012 and would focus on the finalization and adoption of federalism. Because time is of the essence, it was agreed that three critical issues required consideration by the delegates to ensure the completion of the constitution making process and ending the transition on time, by August 20, 2012, as follows:

1. Federalism: The nature of federal structure the country would adopt, including the status of the capital city, Mogadishu;
2. System of Government and Electoral System Design: Consensus on the structure of the federal executive depending on whether the choice of system of government is parliamentary, presidential or hybrid; consensus on the related elements of electoral system design;
3. Operationalizing Garowe 1 Principles related to the constitutional adoption process by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), including the selection process of the members of the NCA and the new federal parliament and the design of the Upper House of Parliament representing the administrative regions.

4. The participants began the conference in a plenary session where they were addressed by the stakeholder principals; Ambassadors from IGAD & AU; Minister of Endowment & Religious Affairs from Djibouti & the UN SRSG for Somalia. Following this, the participants divided themselves into 3 groups to discuss the following topics: (1) Federalism; (2) System of Government & Electoral System; and (3) Operationalizing the Garowe 1 Principles. Each

group was co-chaired by a member of the Committee of Experts & a member of the IFCC supported by members of the Joint Constitution Unit. Ground rules were established, that Garowe 1 Principles were not to be reopened and setting forth a process in the event consensus could not be reached within the time allotted. It was agreed that unresolved issues would be escalated to the principals and that their decision would be respected by all. The conference was concluded via a plenary session celebrating achievements made, and closing with a signing ceremony.

4. Whereas the Participants have considered the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord, the Roadmap, Garowe Principles I and reviewed the Consultative Draft Constitution;

5. Whereas the Signatories reaffirm the unity of the Somali people, the political independence and territorial integrity of the Somali nation, the following principles were agreed by the delegates and signatories of the Roadmap.

These principles, henceforth to be referred to as ***The Garowe II Principles***, shall guide and direct finalization of the draft constitution and the process of ending the transition including the development and enactment of the legal framework therein.

The Garowe II Principles on Federalism, System of Government and Ending of the Transition through Operationalizing Garowe I

1. Federalism - Establishing the Federal States

The Transitional Federal Charter makes reference to a federal state and the Consultative Draft Constitution refers to the establishment of a bicameral federal legislature. The Garowe I Principles reiterate this but do not specify any details. In Garowe II, the following aspects for establishing a federal system were agreed upon:

a. We recognize the Puntland State is a founding federal state and was an existing state upon the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in 2004. We further recognize that Galmudug State as a state within the federation, and it shall, as soon as is practicable, fulfill all the requirements for becoming a full federal state as stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter. The TFG and the International Community are called upon to extend all the necessary assistance to the Galmudug authorities in this regard.
b. The criteria for the formation of new states shall conform to the provisions stipulated in the Charter, which is based on two or more regions coming together.
c. All states are obliged to ensure equal political rights, access and opportunities for all Somalis, including political participation.
d. The creation of new states requires a sustainable regional reconciliation process. An independent commission shall assess a state's conduct of

such a process and the fulfillment of the above criteria. The new Somali Federal Parliament shall vote on ascension to statehood.

e. The federal fiscal system shall include financial transfers and assistance based on the principle of equalization and equity among states.

f. The federal structure shall respect states' rights in the assignment of competences and responsibilities to the states. The national competences shall include essential issues of national interest, notably, but not limited to, foreign affairs, national defense, national monetary policy, natural resources, wealth sharing, citizenship, and immigration.

Status of Mogadishu

g. Mogadishu is the capital city. Its status within the federal set-up shall be decided by the new parliament through the enactment of primary legislation

2. System of Government and Electoral System Design

The Working Group on Systems of Government and Electoral systems considered the issue of which system of government is best suited to Somalia – the Parliamentary or Presidential system – and rigorously deliberated the advantages and disadvantages of both systems.

a. Somalia shall adopt the Parliamentary system as it provides more accountability of the executive to parliament, and checks and balances to the abuse of power.

b. The primary task of the executive shall be vested within the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister. The President shall be the Head of State and will stand for the Unity of the State.

c. The Constitution shall clearly set forth and enumerate the respective powers of the Head of State and the Head of Government.

d. Council of Ministers shall be drawn from within and outside parliament.

Electoral System Design

e. The electoral system for the Lower House shall be based on the principle of proportionality. The details of the electoral system shall be defined by legislation. The new federal parliament shall adopt such legislation by the end of the third month of its first sitting.

3. Operationalizing Garowe Principles

1. Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC)

a. Mandate:

i. The IIEC shall verify nominees for the Constituent Assembly and Parliament against established objective criteria. It shall also engage in raising awareness of the processes for nominating and selecting candidates including ensuring full transparency through publication of names in media outlets and a public

notice and comment period. The IIEC shall not be responsible for selecting members to either body.

b. Membership:
   i. The IIEC shall consist of 15 voting members based on the 4.5 formula (see Garowe I)
   ii. The IIEC shall consist of at least 5 women members
   iii. The IIEC shall include the involvement of international actors as non-voting participants.
c. To ensure trust in the commission, IIEC members must be patriotic, honest, of good standing in Somali society, have no personal political ambitions or loyalties to other states. They must respect and uphold the rights of all Somalis and demonstrate tolerance towards all.
d. The eligibility criteria for IIEC membership shall be as follows:
   i. Somali citizenship
   ii. Aged between 21 and 70 years
   iii. No record of serious crime or crimes against humanity
   iv. Minimum secondary education
   v. Experience in elections or related fields
e. Roadmap signatories assisted by civil society representatives and traditional leaders shall appoint IIEC members based on applications submitted through a public process. The public shall be kept informed of the process through a concerted media campaign.

2. National Constituent Assembly (NCA)

a. Mandate:
   i. The NCA's rules of procedure shall regulate procedures to be followed in the event members cannot reach the required majority for adoption; the rules and procedures shall provide for a process to refer issues back to the drafters based on the vote of a qualified majority; the rules shall further set forth agreed deadlock breaking mechanisms to provide mediation support
b. Membership shall be based on the following:
   i. 1000 members based on the 4.5 formula;
   ii. At least 300 (30%) members shall be women;
   iii. The remaining 700 men and women shall be selected from [a cross section of society, including: youth/students, business people, the Diaspora, religious and traditional leaders, professionals, scholars and existing and emerging regional administrations.
c. Eligibility Criteria:
   i. The criteria noted above for IIEC membership shall apply to NCA nominees except for the following:
      1. Minimum age of 21
      2. No minimum level of education except literacy

3. Relevant experience

d. Selection Process for members of the NCA:
   i. Roadmap signatories assisted by traditional leaders and civil society shall nominate 1000 people based on the 4.5 formula and the criteria set out above;
   ii. Nominations shall be submitted to the IIEC to verify that each nominee meets the above criteria as well as the overall composition;
   iii. If a nominee or list is determined to not meet the criteria they shall be sent back to the Garowe 1 signatories, traditional leaders and civil society to nominate another person or list meeting the criteria to submit to the IIEC, maintaining the 4.5 formula;
   iv. To ensure that the minimum quota for women is implemented, women members shall be determined first;
   v. Nomination lists that do not result in at least 30% women in the NCA must be rejected;

3. The New Federal Parliament

a. Membership in the Lower House shall comprise 225 members
b. The Upper House shall be based on the new configurations of future federal states for a maximum of 54 members.
   i. The selection of the Upper House shall follow the same principles of transparency, inclusivity and representation as govern the selection of other constitutional bodies, with criteria to be elaborated in the new constitution and designed to embody national integration and cohesion, to serve as a "court of second opinion" and custodian of national cultural values and national ethos;
   ii. The Upper House shall come into effect no later than August 2012 as specified in the Garowe I Principles.
   iii. The new Constitution and its Implementation Schedules as well as general provisions clauses shall further govern the permanent make up of the Upper House, and shall set out criteria, size, allocation of seats and composition of the Upper House, as well as a mechanism and process for the formation of the sub-national units;
   iv. After the first term of the new Upper House of the new federal parliament, membership shall be based on the established sub-national units with equal representation.
c. To ensure trust in the federal parliament, members must be patriotic, honest, and of good standing in Somali society. They must respect and uphold the rights of all Somalis and demonstrate tolerance towards all.
d. Eligibility criteria for membership in the new federal parliament shall be:

i. Somali citizenship
ii. Aged between 25-75 years
iii. Minimum secondary school education
iv. No criminal record
v. Not declared mentally incompetent
vi. Respect Islamic values
vii. Relevant experience

e. Selection process of the new federal parliament
   i. Recognized traditional elders assisted by prominent civil society members shall nominate two people for every seat based on the criteria outlined above;
   ii. Nominations shall be sent to the IIEC to verify that they meet the eligibility criteria and overall composition requirements. If they do not, the names must be returned and a new candidate or candidates must be submitted;
   iii. The names of eligible candidates shall be sent back to the nominating entities to select the individuals who shall become representatives in the new federal parliament;
   iv. Women will make up at least 30% of the parliamentarians by way of a set aside along 4.5. Civil society and respected women members of the clans will nominate and select the women.

Whereas, the transition must end by August 20, 2012, and therefore no delay or obstruction will be accepted by the Somali people or the International Community. Spoilers will be identified and named, and appropriate joint action by Somali and international stakeholders will be taken against them. The process will proceed.

Whereas the Signatories recommend that a compensation package be provided to members of Parliament who do not become members of the next parliament.

Whereas, time is of the essence and therefore all relevant parties are hereby directed to immediately, in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter, the Kampala Accord, the Roadmap, Garowe I, Garowe II and other governing instruments:

1. commence finalization of the draft constitution and complete the drafting by 20th of April 2012;
2. complete consultations and civic education on remaining critical issues in the Consultative Draft Constitution;
3. commence formation of the relevant bodies, especially the IIEC and NCA.

The Signatories announce that the next constitutional consultative conference will be held by the end of March 2012 in Mogadishu and will focus on fundamental rights and freedoms.

Signatories:

1. Transitional Federal Government
   President of the Transitional Federal Government
   H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

2. Transitional Federal Parliament
   Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament
   Hon. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden

3. Transitional Federal Government
   Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
   Hon. Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali

4. Puntland
   President of Puntland
   Hon. Dr. Abdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud

5. Galmudug
   President of Galmudug
   Hon. Mohamed Ahmed Aalim

6. Ahlu-Sunna Wal Jamaaca
   Representative of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaaca
   Hon. Khalif Abdulkadir Moalim Nur

7. Special Representative of the
   Secretary General of the UN for Somalia
   Hon. Dr. Augustine Mahiga



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
December 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2012/284

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 May 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 2 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Please find attached herewith the observations of the Government of the Sudan on the communiqué issued by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 24 April 2012 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

12-33404 (E) 080512 090512

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 2 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

28 April 2012

Observations of the Government of the Sudan with regard to the decision adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council concerning the situation between the Sudan and South Sudan and the involvement of the Security Council

1. The mandate of the African Union, a regional body charged with maintaining peace and security, is in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations and the role set out in Chapter VII thereof for regional arrangements and agencies. That mandate is also in keeping with the substance of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. From the time the African Union began its efforts to resolve the Sudan's internal disputes, including the protracted dispute in South Sudan prior to its secession in July 2011, the Sudan has attached great importance to Africa's role, which culminated in the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Abuja Agreement and the Doha Agreement, which are the last two instruments of the Darfur comprehensive settlement, were concluded thanks to the role played by and the leadership of the African Union and regional actors.

2. As we see it, the decision adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 24 April 2012 underscores this role and stresses and reaffirms confidence in the work of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, the mechanism endorsed by the African Union to settle outstanding issues between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. We believe that the African Union would not hesitate to address this issue, particularly in view of its unblemished record in the recent history of the African continent.

3. In view of the foregoing, and in keeping with our national duty to consolidate the foundations of peace and our broader regional and international responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, we feel compelled to make the following observations regarding the decision adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council:

(a) The decision stresses adherence to the principle of not resorting to force in order to achieve any political goal, no matter how legitimate. In practice, this means that, with regard to the dispute between the two countries, all support to and harbouring of armed groups must cease. Peace cannot be achieved unless this principle is respected fully. Although this principle is set out in paragraph 12 of the decision, it is not associated with any time frame, which is a very important requirement for its application. We note that all of the other requirements, without exception, are associated with specific and binding time frames, and that failure to respect those time frames will result in the imposition of sanctions. Some requirements must be fulfilled immediately, while others must be fulfilled in a time frame that does not exceed one or two weeks. In addition to implying disregard for the notions of equality, fairness and justice, we are certain that not associating the

cessation of support to or the harbouring of armed groups with a specific time frame will make this requirement meaningless and push it to the bottom of the list of requirements.

(b) Establishing the basis for peace and security between the two countries is a necessary condition that must be achieved before addressing other matters that will foster and deepen security and peace. Accordingly, the cessation of the constant attacks by South Sudan against the Sudan must be the highest regional priority. It is not appropriate to welcome the so-called withdrawal from Heglig by South Sudan without calling for accountability and a demand to cease threats of force, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 4. With each succeeding threat being greater than the next, we are now back to speaking of the occupation of Heglig, as the head of the South Sudan Government and all other South Sudan officials, without exception, have declared. Moreover, claims are once again being made that Heglig belongs to South Sudan. Those declarations and claims constitute an ongoing aggression and a threat thereof, and are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and international law and custom. As for the related matter of the cessation of aerial bombardments, we are of the view that such bombardments are a legitimate act of self-defence. It would have been better to require both States to refrain from targeting civilians and civilian facilities, which enjoy international protection. Both can be attacked using any type of weapon, including the air force.

(c) The outstanding matters under dispute have been identified, set down in writing and agreed upon. They are not the claims being made by one the two parties. We strongly protest the reference in paragraph 13 (iii) to disputed and claimed border areas. Such claims contradict the principle of respecting the border established on 1 January 1956 and subsequent international confirmation thereof. They are also contrary to international law.

(d) Paragraph 18 of the decision concerning the joint and complementary responsibilities of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council will create a conflict between the mandates of those esteemed councils. These two bodies cannot address the same question simultaneously. This, unfortunately, is what the Peace and Security Council is requesting in its decision when it calls on the Security Council to address this question under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such a request disregards the efforts being made by the Peace and Security Council itself to resolve the question and the time frames it has established.

(e) The direct cause of tensions along the countries' border are the repeated aggressions committed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), particularly its 9th and 10th Divisions. Its direct support for the so-called SPLA-North has resulted in the occupation of parts of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states, causing humanitarian suffering to which the entire world has been witness. Paragraph 16 effectively legitimizes the so-called SPLA-North, even as it continues to use arms and violence to achieve its political goals. This is unacceptable and will serve to encourage and provide an example to other armed groups in the continent. The call to negotiate with SPLA-North on the basis of the Framework Agreement referenced in paragraph 16, which the Sudanese Government has rejected, will not produce results that are conducive to regional peace and security, nor will it put an end to humanitarian suffering in the two countries.

(f) The decision does not address the concerns of the Sudan regarding the deliberate destruction of oil facilities and the substantial material damage caused by the forces of the South Sudan Government during their illegal occupation of the Heglig region. The Government of the Sudan trusts that the Council will shoulder its responsibilities in that regard by establishing a commission of enquiry to assess losses and by requiring the South Sudan Government to pay appropriate compensation.

(g) The Government of the Sudan believes that implementing the decisions set out in the road map requires the operationalization of the joint security mechanisms, which the South Sudan Government has consistently sought to delay. Doing so would make it possible to meet the deadlines set out in the decision and achieve positive results on the ground.

United Nations A/66/788–S/2012/285

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 May 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda items 35, 39 and 67

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Letter dated 30 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for the months of February and March 2012 (see annex). As a result of those violations, two servicemen of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan were wounded. According to the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia continued intensive fire on both military and civilian targets in Azerbaijan from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 39 and 67, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-32966 (E) 150512

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for the months of February and March 2012

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
1.	1 February	At different times	Berdavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Adjacent area near Kemerli village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
2.		At different times	Occupied areas near Shikhlar, Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, and unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
3.		At different times	Occupied areas near Merzili village, Aghdam district, and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
4.	2 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Merzili village, Aghdam district and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
5.		At different times	Occupied areas near Chilyaburt village, Tar-Tar district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic Armenia or situated close to fire point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
6.	3 February	18.30-19.00	Occupied areas near Javahirli and Taghibeyli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
7.	6 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Chilyaburt village, Tar-Tar district, and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
8.	7 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Chilyaburt and Giziloba villages, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
9.	8 February	20.15-20.20	Occupied area near Meshdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
10.	9 February	04.00-04.05	Occupied area near Meshdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
11.	10 February	At different times	Occupied unknown heights near Geranboy and Khojavand districts and occupied areas near Shurabad village, Aghdam district, Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
12.	11 February	At different times	Occupied unknown heights near Geranboy and Khojavand districts and occupied areas near Shurabad village, Aghdam district, Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
13.	12 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Yusifjanli and Shikhlar villages, Aghdam district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
14.	13 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Yusifjanli and Shikhlar villages, Aghdam district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
15.		16.20-16.30	Occupied unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
16.	14 February	At different times	Unknown heights, Krasnoselsk district, Armenia	Unknown heights, Gedabey district and adjacent areas, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
17.	15 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Chayli village, Tar-Tar district, and Merzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
18.	16 February	At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Jabrayil district, and occupied areas near Chayli village, Tar-Tar district, Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, and Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
19.	17 February	At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Jabrayil district, and occupied areas near Chayli village, Tar-Tar district, Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, and Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
20.		13.25-13.40	Occupied area near Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm	—
21.		19.10-19.30	Occupied area near Chayli village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm	—
22.	19 February	17.00-17.05	Unknown heights and the area near Aygezor village, Berd district, Armenia	Adjacent area near Gosha and Munchuglu villages, Tovuz district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
23.	20 February	03.45-04.00	Occupied area near Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
24.		21.10-21.15	Occupied area near Yusifkhanli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
25.	21 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, and Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
26.	22 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
27.	23 February	At different times	Occupied areas near Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
28.	24 February	19.40-19.50	Occupied area near Shikhlar village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
29.	26 February	At different times	Unknown heights, Berd and Krasnoselsk districts, Armenia	Adjacent area, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
30.		At different times	Occupied area near Shurabad village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
31.	27 February	At different times	Unknown heights, Berd and Krasnoselsk districts, Armenia	Adjacent area, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
32.		At different times	Occupied area near Shurabad village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
33.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Geranboy, Jabrayil and Fizuli districts, and occupied areas near Goyarkh, Chilyaburt and Giziloba villages, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
34.	28 February	At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Geranboy, Jabrayil and Fizuli districts, and occupied areas near Goyarkh, Chilyaburt and Giziloba villages, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
35.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Fizuli district, occupied areas near Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Chilyaburt village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
36.	29 February	At different times	Occupied area, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm	Lieutenant of the armed forces of Azerbaijan, Parvin Aliyev, was wounded
37.	29 February	A. different times	The area near Berdavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Adjacent area near Kemerli village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
38.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Jabrayil and Fizuli districts, and occupied area near Chilyaburt village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
39.	1 March	At different times	The area near Berdavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Adjacent area near Kemerli village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
40.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Jabrayil and Fizuli districts, and occupied area near Chilyabert village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
41.	4 March	At different times	The area near Voskepar village, Noyemberyan district, and Azatamut district, Ijevan district, Armenia	Adjacent areas near Ashaghi Askipara and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
42.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Khojavand district, and occupied areas near Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, and Chilyabert village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
43.	5 March	At different times	The area near Voskepar village, Noyemberyan district, and Azatamut district, Ijevan district, Armenia	Adjacent areas near Ashaghi Askipara and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
44.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Khojavand district, and occupied areas near Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, and Chilyabert village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
45.		At different times	The area near Berbaker and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	The area near Gizil Hajili and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
46.	6 March	At different times	Occupied areas near Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, and Goyarkh village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
47.		At different times	The area near Berbaker and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	Adjacent areas, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
48.		At different times	Occupied areas near Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, and Goyarkh village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
49.		At different times	Occupied areas near Garakhanbeyli, Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
50.	8 March	11.00-11.15 11.50-12.05 14.00-14.15	Occupied area near Merzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
51.		16.30-16.55 22.10-22.20	Occupied area near Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
52.	9 March	15.05-15.20 16.20-16.50	Occupied unknown heights and areas near Garakhanbeyli village, Fizuli district, Merzili village, Aghdam district, and Chilyabert village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
53.	10 March	At different times	The area near Chinarli village, Berd district, Armenia	The area near Agbulag, Tovuz district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
54.	11 March	At different times	Occupied areas near Ashaghi Veyselli village and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
55.		At different times	The area near Chinarli village, Berd district, Armenia	The area near Agbulag, Tovuz district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
56.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
57.		08.40-08.45	Occupied area near Merzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
58.		08.45-08.50	Unknown heights, Krasnoselsk district, Armenia	Unknown heights, Gedabey district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
59.		14.45-15.20	Occupied area near Shykhlar village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
60.	12 March	16.30-16.31	Occupied areas near Chilyabert and Giziloba villages, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
61.		16.30-16.40	Occupied area near Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
62.		20.05-20.30	Unknown heights, Ijevan district, Armenia	Gizilhajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
63.		21.40-21.50	The area near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Gizihajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
64.	13 March	22.40-22.50	Occupied area near Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
		01.50-01.55	The area near Aykedzor village, Berd district and Berbaker village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Adjacent area near Munjuglu village, Tovuz district, and Gizilhajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
65.	14 March	At different times	Occupied area near Ashaghi Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
66.		At different times	The area near Garasu village, Berd district and Berbaker village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Unnamed heights, Tovuz district and the area near Gizilhajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
67.		At different times	Occupied areas near Giziloba village, Tar-Tar district, and Goradiz, Ashaghi Seyidahmedli and Garakhanbeyli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	—
68.		22.40-22.50 21.00-21.05	Berkaber and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	Gizilhajili and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
69.		At different times	Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Askipara and Gushchuayrim villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
70.		12.40-12.45	Occupied area near unnamed heights, Geranboy district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
71.		22.40-22.50	Occupied area in the Giziloba village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
72.		18.45-19.00	Occupied area near Shykhlar village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
73.	15 March	01.45-02.00	Occupied area near Shykhlar village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
74.			Armenia	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm	Elshad Isayev, soldier of the armed forces of Azerbaijan, was wounded
75.		At different times	Unnamed heights, Ijevan and Krasnoselsk districts, Armenia, areas near Aygovit and Berkaber villages, Ijevan district, and Berekamavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Unnamed heights and areas near Balajafarli, Gizilhajili and Kemerli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
76.	16 March	At different times	Unknown heights, Ijevan and Krasnoselsk districts, Armenia, areas near Aygovit and Berkaber villages, Ijevan district, and Berekamavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Unknown heights and areas near Balajafarli, Gizilhajili and Kemerli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
77.		19.20-19.26 22.55-23.01	Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Gizilhajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
78.		22.10-22.15	Occupied area in the Shykhlar village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
79.	18 March	At different times	The areas near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, and Barekamavan village, Noyembryan district, Armenia	The areas near Gizilhajili and Gaymagli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
80.		At different times	Occupied unknown heights, Fizuli and Khojavand districts, and the occupied area near Merzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
81.	26 March	11.00-11.15	The area near Berkaber and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Azerbaijan	Gizilhajili and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
82.	27 March	00.30-00.40 02.40-02.45 02.20-02.25	The area near Berkaber and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	Gizilhajili and Jafarli villages, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
83.		05.40-05.50 05.50-06.00	Occupied areas near Gorgan, Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli and Goradiz villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
84.		02.55-03.10	Occupied area near Seysulan village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
85.		At different times	Occupied areas near Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, Goradiz and Ashaghi Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district, and occupied unknown heights, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	—
86.	28 March	At different times	The areas near Voskepan village, Noyemberyan district, Berkaber village, Ijevan district, and unknown heights, Krasnoselsk district, Armenia	Adjacent areas near Gushchuayrim and Gizilhajili villages, Gazakh district, and unknown heights, Gedabey district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
87.	29 March	At different times	The areas near Voskepan village, Noyemberyan district, Berkaber village, Ijevan district, and unknown heights, Krasnoselsk district, Armenia	Adjacent areas near Gushchuayrim and Gizilhajili villages, Gazakh district, and unknown heights, Gedabey district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
88.	30 March	15.30-15.40 16.45-16.55	Unknown heights, Motsakert village, Berd district, Armenia	Alibeyli village, Tovuz district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—
89.	31 March	06 22-06.25	Berd village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Kemerli village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	—

Annex to the identical letters dated 25 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Monday, 23 April 2012

Homs governorate

1. At 0100 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in the region of Bab Tadmur. The forces returned fire. One officer was wounded.

2. At 0600 hours, an armed terrorist group fired gunshots and rocket-propelled grenades at law enforcement forces in Qarabis and Qusur, killing a civilian, Muhammad Mayhub, and wounding five members of the People's Committees.

3. At 0600 hours, armed terrorist groups also opened fire on members of the law enforcement forces in Jabb al-Jandali, Bab al-Siba', Bab Hud, Suq al-Hashish, Karm Shams, Bayyadah and Rastan, without causing injury.

4. At 0645 hours, an armed terrorist group attacked a law enforcement forces checkpoint near Khalid ibn al-Walid School in Tall Kalakh, injuring one.

5. At 1030 hours, snipers from an armed terrorist group opened sporadic fire on members of the law enforcement forces in Zayr Street, injuring one officer.

6. At 1100 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire at a law enforcement forces checkpoint near the agricultural bank in Qusayr, injuring one officer.

7. At 1150 hours, two armed terrorist groups attacked a law enforcement forces checkpoint at the Tripoli traffic light. A member of one of the armed groups was captured, along with his weapon.

8. At 2245 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in Qarabis quarter. Fire was returned. Three officers were injured in the attack.

9. At 2330 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in Khalidiyah quarter. Fire was returned. One officer was injured in the attack.

10. At 2340 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in Rastan. Fire was returned. One officer was injured in the attack.

11. A law enforcement forces checkpoint came under fire and armed men deployed in Khalidiyah, Karm Shams, Qusur, Qarabis, Dahr al-Magharah, the city centre markets, Wadi Siyah, Jurat al-Shayyah, Shamas, Zayr Street, Matahin, Bab Tadmur, Warshah, Bab al-Durayb, Adawiyah and Rastan.

12. Armed men deployed in Talbisah and the surrounding countryside, the Husn-Zara area of Tall Kalakh and Rastan and the surrounding countryside.

13. The body of an unidentified woman was found in Talbisah.

14. An armed terrorist group attacked the bakery in the village of Karamiyah in Talbisah, killing one citizen and abducting two others.

Idlib governorate

15. At 0100 hours, the body of Abdullah ibn Hassan Ajami, approximately 27 years of age, was taken to the National Hospital in Idlib. The victim had been shot in the neck by unidentified men.

16. At 0200 hours, a mine exploded in the village of Jarjanaz, killing 15, including six men, four women and five children.

17. At 1300 hours, an armed group at Ma'rrat al-Na'san on the old Idlib–Aleppo road abducted Muhammad bin Mahdi Fawwaz, Ali al-Hussein and his son, Ahmad, and one other unidentified person. Muhammad bin Mahdi Fawwaz was able to escape from the armed men.

18. At 1400 hours, a group of some 8 to 10 armed men detonated three explosive devices as a law enforcement forces patrol was passing on the Ladhiqiyah–Jisr al-Shughur highway (at the Khan al-Jawz turnoff). The patrol was shot at and fire was returned.

19. At 1500 hours, Ghayyath ibn Fahd al-Mutlaq (born 1974 in Taftanaz) alleged to the administrator of Idlib region that armed men attacked his house on 14 April 2012, firing shots from a variety of weapons. The attackers destroyed the house, burned all its contents and stole the sum of 270,000 Syrian pounds and four 21-carat gold bracelets. He recognized some of the attackers, all of whom came from the village of Taftanaz.

20. At 1800 hours, an armed terrorist group abducted Chief Warrant Officer Lu'ay Jabbadi and conscript Hasan Hamdu as they were travelling in a vehicle in the Khan Shaykhun district.

21. Armed men deployed in Ma'arrah and the surrounding countryside and in Harim and the countryside east of Jisr al-Shughur.

22. There was sporadic shooting in Saraqib, Ariha, Harim and Ma'arrah.

Dayr al-Zawr governorate

23. At 0000 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device in front of the special operations battalion at Dayr al-Zawr. At that same time, there was intense gun fire, which broke a window of one of the rooms and damaged one of the vehicles.

24. At 0000 hours, shots were fired and a stick of dynamite was thrown at a passing patrol of the security and law enforcement forces in the Qusur quarter of the city, wounding a police conscript, Hani Khalid al-Ali, in the face and abdomen with shrapnel. He was taken to the military hospital in Dayr al-Zawr.

25. At 0030 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device in Qusur quarter, injuring a police officer.

26. At 1330 hours, an armed terrorist group seized a Government-owned Nissan double-cabin pickup, licence plate No. 489736 (Dayr al-Zawr), that was assigned to the Busayrah district educational complex.

27. At 1330 hours, an armed man riding a motorcycle opened fire on members of the guard at a military barracks in Haql al-'Umar, injuring one police officer.

28. At 0830 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on members of the law enforcement forces in Jurah quarter. Fire was returned and one of the terrorists was killed.

29. At 0900 hours, security patrols arrested Majid Abdullah al-Khalaf, from Busayrah, the leader of the Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqas battalion of the so-called Free Syrian Army, and Ramadhan al-Mashuh, while they were in the house of Chief Warrant Officer Khalid Yusuf Abdulqadir, who is assigned to the military hospital in Dayr al-Zawr. After an exchange of fire, four military rifles, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a sniper rifle, two PKC machine-guns, a Simonov rifle, two explosive devices and a variety of ammunition were seized. No-one was hurt.

30. At 0930 hours, an armed terrorist group shot and killed Chief Warrant Officer Akram Ali al-Fahd of the State Security section at Mayadin.

31. At 1200, an armed terrorist group estimated to number 40 persons riding motorcycles attacked the Subaykhan police station in the Asharah area of Mayadin district. Shots were fired inside the station.

32. At 2000 hours, some 15 armed men attacked Gharanid police station.

33. An armed terrorist group attacked a law enforcement forces patrol in Dayr al-Zawr, detonating an explosive device and firing shots. One member of the law enforcement forces was killed.

34. There was a skirmish between law enforcement forces and an armed terrorist group in Thawrah quarter in Dayr al-Zawr, resulting in the death of one armed man and the arrest of another and the seizure of a number of weapons.

Dar'a governorate

35. At 0203 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on the house of Muhammad Sulayman al-Khawalida in Sahwah.

36. At 0330 hours, Samir Abdulmajid al-Ahmad was taken to Dar'a National Hospital after being wounded in the abdomen by stray gunfire in the town of Shaykh Miskin.

37. At 0800 hours, an armed terrorist group shot Dr. Adnan Tawfiq Samit in front of his house in Qusur quarter, fatally wounding him.

38. At 0800 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire in the village of Nu'aymah at vehicles passing on the Busra al-Sham–Dar'a road, in order to stop them from entering Dar'a city. A 14-year old girl, Majdulin Mahmud Sulayman, was shot in the face and neck and was taken to Dar'a National Hospital.

39. At 0830 hours, as he was on his way to work, an armed terrorist group attempted to assassinate Colonel Ratib Ahmad Junud on the Tabilayn–Tall al-Samn road, wounding him.

40. At 0930, some 10 armed men attacked an office of the Water Resources Directorate located behind the conserves factory in Muzayrib, seizing two vehicles, one belonging to the government and the other privately owned.

41. At 0945 hours, unidentified armed men prevented students from reaching school in the town of Busra al-Sham. Unidentified men using mosque loudspeakers called for a general strike to bring down the regime.

42. At 1100 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on soldiers at an army checkpoint in Harak. The soldiers returned fire, wounding Khalid al-Dik, who was taken to hospital where he was arrested by military security, as a wanted man.

43. At 1300, an armed terrorist group opened fire on a shared taxi operating between Dar'a and Busra al-Sham, near the village of Mu'riyah, injuring a female civilian.

44. At 1330 hours, an explosive device was detonated in the Gharbi quarter of Da'il town, killing one child, Abdulqadir Muhammad Qasim al-Sharif, and wounding another with shrapnel.

45. At 1540 hours, unidentified armed men in the town of Busra al-Sham opened fire on the vehicle of Mustafa Mazra'ani, who was being accompanied by Husam Mazra'ani, killing the former.

46. At 1800 hours, an armed terrorist group ambushed members of the law enforcement forces near Khirbat Ghazalah bridge, wounding an officer.

47. At 2100 hours, an armed terrorist group opened intense fire on and launched a rocket-propelled grenade at a law enforcement forces checkpoint located near Ghabaghib mosque and Ghabaghib police station.

48. At 2300 hours, some 100 armed terrorists attacked Jadal police station with a variety of weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, wounding a police officer and damaging the station building.

49. At 2340 hours, an armed terrorist group ambushed and opened fire on a law enforcement forces patrol in the town of Mismiyah, killing Lieutenant Colonel Said Sulayman al-Aasi and wounding another member of the law enforcement forces.

50. At 2400, an armed terrorist group opened fire on and attacked a law enforcement forces checkpoint in the town of Da'il. Fire was returned and one of the terrorists was killed.

51. Two 40-kg remotely controlled explosive devices were discovered, one behind the courthouse and the other in the marketplace. They were defused by military engineers.

52. Maysir Shamikh al-Ahmad and Muhammad Alwan al-Ahmad, from the village of Warid in the Azra' region, attacked a police officer, Hussein Ali al-Faraj, from a law enforcement unit in Damascus, stabbing him in an attempt to make him desert. He was taken to hospital. It should be noted that the attackers had previously set fire to the victim's house, in December 2011.

53. An armed terrorist group attacked a number of civilians in the town of Busra, killing one and injuring another. The attack also prevented students from going to school.

54. Two explosive devices were found at Dar'a station and an explosive device was detonated in Sabil quarter.

55. Law enforcement forces checkpoints at Dar'a station, Nu'aymah, Tafas, Mismiyah, Harak and Da'il came under fire.

56. An armed terrorist group targeted a number of civilian in the town of Nu'aymah, killing one man and a child.

Aleppo governorate

57. At 0630, a man was fatally wounded when has was shot in the head by an armed terrorist group as he was passing on the road linking the quarters of Amiriyah and Salah al-Din, near the new school complex. It was subsequently learned that the victim was Ala' Abdulqadir Abd, an Iraqi national.

58. At 0900, an armed terrorist group intercepted a vehicle belonging to the scientific research centre as it was passing through Rashidin quarter. After letting the driver go, the terrorists stole the vehicle.

59. At 1200 hours, an armed terrorist group using machine-guns and sniper rifles opened fire on Atarib region building and the military forces stationed in front that building and in front of the municipality building. The terrorists fired from in between residential buildings some distance away. Fire was returned. First Lieutenant Hussein Kazo and conscript Muhammad Madino were wounded in the skirmish and taken to Aleppo military hospital.

60. At 1515 hours, an armed terrorist group ambushed a law enforcement forces patrol passing near the Kafr Nuran–Atarib turnoff, wounding two members of the law enforcement forces.

61. At 1900 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on members of the law enforcement forces in the municipality building, which is located next to the Atarib region directorate, wounding one conscript.

62. At 1930 hours, an armed terrorist group abducted two employees of the water unit located on the Qabbasin road. Law enforcement forces set out for the location, but before they reached their destination, they were ambushed by a large number of armed men equipped with night-vision goggles, who opened intense machine-gun and sniper fire. As the skirmish was taking place with the terrorist group, armed men arrived in vehicles to back up the terrorists. A number of armed terrorists were wounded or killed; the skirmish left two members of the law enforcement forces dead and seven wounded. During the skirmish, another terrorist group of 20 armed men took advantage of the situation to attack the police station in the town of Qabbasin. Shots were fired at the station, which fell to the attackers. The terrorists abducted 11 members of the police force and seized 12 Kalashnikovs with their ammunition and three military pistols. Two vehicles were seized from the armed men: a white Kia, licence plate No. 947471, and a silver Ford, licence plate No. 155269 (Damascus).

63. At 2005 hours, an armed terrorist group riding in two vehicles attacked Minakh airport. Fire was returned.

64. Two explosive devices planted at the Biyanun turnoff were defused.

65. A noise bomb was thrown at the home of the head of military installations in Aleppo.

Ladhiqiyah governorate

66. Four food trucks were ambushed near the village of Ghaymiyah in the Haffah district. There was an exchange of fire between the armed gangs and members of the law enforcement forces. Two explosive devices were detonated and two were defused.

Damascus governorate

67. At 1600 hours, an explosive device that had been placed underneath a private car went off in the Shurtah quarter in Tadamun district, causing material damage. The vehicle was a Skoda, licence plate No. 209108 (Damascus), belonging to Ibrahim Fariz Salim (born 1973 in Damascus), an employee of the Damascus governorate.

68. At 2130 hours, near the Abu Salim mosque in Masakin Barzah, an armed group shot at the owner of a computer store with a military pistol. It was subsequently learned that the owner of the store, Jamil al-Hussein, who was taken to the Ibn al-Nafis Hospital, is a chief warrant officer in the law enforcement forces.

69. An explosive device was defused in a garden beside the central vegetable market in Mazzah.

Rif Dimashq governorate

70. At 0600 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in Duma, Irbin and Hirista. The group also burned the courthouse and several Government offices in Duma. These violations occurred while the international observers were present in Duma.

71. At 1000 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement forces in Hirista, wounding one officer.

72. At 1200 hours, an armed terrorist group intercepted and seized a vehicle belonging to the scientific research centre, while it was passing through Irbin.

73. At 1400 hours, in Duma, armed men opened fire on a shared taxi that was carrying two men from a workshop. The passengers were forced out of the taxi and the vehicle was stolen.

74. At 1400 hours, 20 armed men entered the home of Muhammad Nabil al-Hifni in the town of Duma and abducted his brother's wife, Layla Muhammad al-Jaza'iri (born 1966 in Damascus) and her four children, taking them to an unknown location, where they were beaten and tortured. Mobile telephones and the sum of 10,000 Syrian pounds were stolen. At 1800 hours, the abducted children were released, but their mother remains captive.

75. At 2400 hours, during the inspection of a Lebanese-registered vehicle coming from Lebanon, 11 rocket-propelled grenades, 11 grenade-propellant charges, 1 grenade launcher, 8 mortars, 1 sniper rifle, 1 sniper-rifle scope, 3 short-barrel machine-guns, 4 military pistols, 6 empty Kalashnikov magazines, 6 empty sniper-rifle magazines, 63 remote detonators and a large quantity of ammunition were found. The car was being shadowed by an accompanying vehicle, which drove off at high speed past the exit checkpoint. The security forces were able to pursue it and bring it back before it crossed the Lebanese border, but the driver was able to flee. It was subsequently learned that the driver was Hasan Ahmad Sadiq, from Binnish, Idlib; he was driving a Chevrolet vehicle bearing a Lebanese licence plate No. 358549.

76. The body of an unidentified man in his 40s was found in the village of Bayt Siwa, Kafr Batna town. He had been shot in the chest and his body showed signs of torture.

77. Husam bin Mahmud Shahadah, who had been killed by a gunshot to the head, and 18-year old Fawzi Jamil Baytan, who had been shot in the right forearm and in his face, were taken to Ridwan Hospital in Daraya.

78. An armed terrorist group in the town of Malihah seized a Government pickup assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture from its driver, Firas Khalifah, while he was in the veterinary centre at Shab'a.

79. The body of a 35-year old woman was found in the town of Damir; she had been killed by a gunshot wound to the head. The body was taken to Jayrud Hospital.

80. An armed terrorist group in Hirista seized a vehicle belonging to Syrian radio and television from its driver, Bashar al-Turk.

81. An armed terrorist group abducted Ali bin Hussein Uthman, employed by Duma fire brigade, as he was leaving his house in Hirista.

82. In the town of Hirista, a gold-coloured Honda Accord, licence plate No. 876452 (Damascus), was seized by three armed men driving a black Hyundai, licence plate number unknown.

83. A burgundy Opel Astra, licence plate No. 532243 (Damascus), belonging to the Road Communication Authority and assigned to Dr. Muhammad Karidi was seized by an armed group.

84. The driver of a Saba vehicle, licence plate No. 613733 (Rif Dimashq), was abducted by a man who got into the car with him and made him drive to an unknown location, where he was left and the car taken.

85. Ahmad Sheikh Awad was abducted by armed men on his way to work at Adra telephone centre, together with his Government vehicle, licence plate No. 886804 (Rif Dimashq).

86. In the town of Jadidah Artuz, four armed men with Kalashnikov rifles and driving a blue Skoda vehicle, killed retired Lieutenant Colonel As'ad Ahmad Ismail (born 1969 in Masyaf) and his brother, Chief Warrant Officer Sulayman Ahmad Ismail (born 1971), in his domestic appliances shop.

87. In the town of Babila, there was an explosion in a rubbish container in Da'bul Street, which separates the countryside from the city at Daf al-Shawk, killing two persons. One was blown to pieces and the other had his limbs severed. An explosive device found some 100 metres away was defused. Seven vehicles were damaged and the windows of several buildings were shattered.

88. In the town of Tall, a Mazda vehicle registered to the military, licence plate No. 902382, and assigned to the Military Construction Establishment was seized by four armed men from its driver, Nidal al-Awadh.

89. At the town of Daraya, the southern ring road and the Dummar project road were blocked with containers and burning tyres.

Hama governorate

90. At 0800 hours, an armed terrorist group shot dead the civilian Bassam Baloul in Zawr Taqsis.

91. At 0900 hours, at the Sibahi roundabout in Mazarib, an armed terrorist group shot dead Colonel Mahmud Zaytun and Chief Warrant Officer Jihad Ismail.

92. At 0900 hours, Fawzi bin Abdulrahman Hijazi (born 1974 in Hamidiyah) alleged to the chief of Hamidiyah police station that, at 1100 hours, seven armed men with automatic rifles seized a white Kia truck, licence plate No. 453542 (Damascus), leased by the Royal Company of Damascus to Abdulrahman Salih Talla', owner of a cargo transportation company in Hamah, along with its cargo and the sum of 4,000 Syrian pounds. The incident took place at the Ma'arrah turnoff in Idlib governorate.

93. At 1000 hours, an armed terrorist group shot and wounded a police officer, Muhammad Ahmad Assaf, near the Assaf petrol station in Mu'ardis.

94. At 1000 hours, unidentified armed men in Sawa'iq quarter opened fire on a pickup truck carrying Colonel Mahmud Zaytun and Chief Warrant Officer Jihad Tawfiq Ismail, killing them both.

95. At 1000 hours, Ziyad bin Muhammad al-Ghawi (born in Hama in 1969) alleged to the head of Shari'ah district that, at 0530 hours, while he was in a quarter south of the stadium transporting employees to the Rawadi sweet shop, where he also works, four masked men armed with automatic rifles stole his silver Hyundai van, licence plate No. 807237, and his mobile phone, insulted him and accused him of cooperating with the security agencies.

96. At 1000 hours, Ammar Abdulfattah al-Musa (born in 1987) alleged to the head of Shari'ah district that he had found his father's Mazda vehicle, licence plate No. 710720 (Tartus), parked in front of his house, which is located in the area to the south of the stadium. Its colour had been changed from silver to brown, and its front and rear windows had been smashed. He also stated that, while inspecting his father's shop, he discovered that 250,000 Syrian pounds, a computer and a surveillance camera had been stolen.

97. At 1040 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device by remote control in the Marabid quarter.

98. At 1300 hours, an armed man shot and killed a civilian, Anas Mu'ti, in public in the Sabil quarter.

99. At 1300 hours, an armed man shot and injured a child, Sanad Talal al-Muhammad.

100. At 1400 hours, the bodies of two men were found in a rainfall collection ditch on the Salamiyah-Raqqa road near the village of Shahatiyah in the Athriya area. One of the bodies was that of Adnan Jumah al-Sarmini, who had been shot in the head and face and whose hands had been tied behind his back with a plastic cord. The other was that of his son Husam, born in 1986, who had been shot in the back. Sixteen 7.62-calibre automatic-rifle casings were found near the bodies.

101. At 1430 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law enforcement officers in the Sawa'iq quarter, killing police officers Ali Amir Haydar and Ali Muhammad Baylun and Sergeant Muhammad Ibrahim Shayhah. The terrorists Samir Khalid Harb (born in Hama in 1984) and Abdulrazzaq ibn Shatat (born in Hama in 1990) were also killed, and the terrorists Milad Hawyan al-Uqla, along with his brothers Iyad and Mahmud, and Ahmad Ali al-Aswad and Ali Muhammad Da'bul

were captured. Three rifles, a PKC machine-gun and a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher with two grenades were seized.

102. At 1500 hours, Malik bin Nayif al-Masri, a resident of Sabil quarter (born in Jibrin in 1974), was taken to the medical centre hospital in Hama after he had been killed by a stray bullet in an exchange of fire between law enforcement forces and an armed terrorist group.

103. At 1600 hours, Muhammad bin Faiz al-Sha'ar, a resident of Sabil quarter (born in 1989 in Bashurah), was taken to Amuri Hospital after he had been shot in an exchange of fire between law enforcement forces and an armed terrorist groups.

104. At 1700 hours, Muhammad bin Mahmud al-Ubayd (born in 1988) and Haytham bin Na'san Qisqas (born in 1970), residents of Masha'a quarter, were taken to the medical centre hospital in Hama after they had been shot in Arba'in quarter. No other identifying information is available for either person.

105. At 2100 hours, an armed terrorist group attacked the home of police officer Abdulhadi Muhammad Haqqi in the village of Muhajirin and abducted him.

106. At 2300 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on a law enforcement forces checkpoint near the Buhrah roundabout in the Aleppo road quarter.

107. The body of Muhammad Awad Maznar (born in 1972) was taken to the National Hospital after he had been shot dead in the Masha'a al-Arba'in quarter. An injured, unidentified civilian who had been found near the victim's body was also taken to that same hospital.

108. A child was taken to the medical centre hospital after being shot by an unidentified person in the Fayha' quarter.

109. The body of Anas Hasan Mu'ti (born in 1982) was taken to Badr Hospital after he had been shot and killed by an unidentified person in the Sabil quarter.

110. The body of Bassam Jawhar Balul, a civilian employee in a defence factory, was taken to hospital after he had been shot by an unidentified person at the Zawr al-Taqsis turnoff on his way to work.

111. Three unidentified bodies were found in Hama and Salamiyah.

112. An armed terrorist group set up a barricade in the Marabit quarter.

113. A number of armed terrorists in Jala' quarter blocked the road near Jala' citadel.

Syrian-Lebanese border

114. At 0200 hours, two armed men, one Lebanese and the other Syrian, attempted to smuggle weapons from Lebanese territory into the Zabadani area, including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, sharpshooters' rifles, pistols equipped with lasers for targeting, mortars and explosive devices. The men were captured and the weapons seized.

115. At 2330 hours, some 5 to 7 armed men opened fire on and attacked a border guard patrol station in the Burayj area. Fire was returned.

116. At 1730 hours, some 3 to 5 armed men opened fire on border guards in Jisr al-Shughur and attempted to infiltrate Syrian territory. The border guards returned fire and the armed men fled.

Syrian-Iraqi border

117. At 0200 hours, some 40 armed men who were attempting to infiltrate from Iraqi territory opened fire on border guards in the Mayadin area. A clash ensued and the armed men fled.

118. At 0500 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on border guards posted at the Abuna station and attempted to infiltrate Syrian territory. The terrorists were pursued and forced to flee.

Syrian-Jordanian border

119. At 2330 hours, some 5 to 10 armed men opened fire on border guards and attempted to bring a number of persons into Jordanian territory from Dar'a. One border guard was injured in the ensuing exchange of fire. Sixty-five persons were detained.

United Nations S/2012/287

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 May 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 2 May 2012 from the Acting Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) dated 2 May 2012, submitted in accordance with the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13) (see annex).

(*Signed*) João Maria **Cabral**
Acting Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

12-32867 (E) 040512

Please recycle

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) submitted in accordance with the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 16 April 2012

1. On 16 April 2012, by presidential statement S/PRST/2012/13, the Security Council agreed to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009). The Security Council further directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake this task and to report to the Security Council within 15 days.

2. In order to fulfil this task, the Committee met on 18 April 2012 and held additional informal consultations. Six Member States submitted proposals for designations. The Committee reviewed these proposals carefully.

3. On 2 May 2012, the Committee acted in line with the Security Council directive and approved the following.

A. Designate additional entities and items

4. The Committee designates the following three entities to be subject to the provisions of and the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006):

1. Amroggang Development Banking Corporation

- *Description*: Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing ballistic missiles sales of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main financial entity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Security Council designated SHIG, in its resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in the ballistic missile programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- *Location*: Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- *Also known as*: Amroggang Development Bank; Amnokkang Development Bank

2. Green Pine Associated Corporation

- *Description*: Green Pine Associated Corporation ("Green Pine") has taken over many of the activities of KOMID. KOMID was designated

by the Committee in April 2009 and is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related materiel from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms.

- *Location*: c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea; Nungrado, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- *Also known as*: Cho'ngsong United Trading Company; Chongsong Yonhap; Ch'o'ngsong Yo'nhap; Chosun Chawo'n Kaebal T'uja Hoesa; Jindallae; Ku'mhaeryong Company Ltd; Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation; Saeingp'il Company

3. Korea Heungjin Trading Company

- *Description*: The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. We suspect it has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and more specifically with the KOMID procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Security Council designated SHIG, in its resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in the ballistic missile programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- *Location*: Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- *Also known as*: Hunjin Trading Co., Korea Henjin Trading Co., Korea Hengjin Trading Company

B. Update information contained on the Committee list

5. The Committee determines that the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes in document S/2012/235 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

6. The Committee determines that the items contained in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

C. Workplan

7. The Committee has updated its annual workplan.

United Nations S/2012/288

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 May 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 2 May 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter that represents the position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2012/244) (see annex).

I would highly appreciate if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council, before the date of the discussion of the report by the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Louay **Falouh**

12-33461 (E) 090512 090512

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 2 May 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

On instructions from my Government, I wish to bring to your attention the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the fifteenth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2012/244).

- The Syrian Arab Republic would like to reaffirm that it respects Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence.

- With regard to paragraphs 3, 17 and 36, Syria considers it unacceptable that its internal situation continues to be deliberately and inexplicably conflated with the Secretary-General's specific mandate under resolution 1559 (2004), which is concerned fundamentally with monitoring the situation in Lebanon. The Syrian Army operations along the Syrian-Lebanese border, to which the report refers, are legitimate in the context of the Syrian authorities' exercise of their territorial sovereignty in order to prevent terrorist infiltration or arms trafficking into Syrian territory. The information regarding the planting of landmines was taken from unreliable media sources. The report surprisingly states that the killing of a Lebanese journalist was a result of gunfire from the Syrian Army, without allowing for the slightest investigation that could demonstrate the opposite conclusion.

- With regard to paragraphs 5 and 8, Syria reiterates that it does not accept the report's references to the delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, which is a bilateral matter; international customary law upholds States' sovereignty in respect of the adoption and implementation of such measures. Syria reaffirms that the real obstacle to the final delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border is Israel's continued aggression and its occupation of the Syrian Golan and the Shab'a Farms. This occupation makes it impossible to delineate the border in those areas. The international community must take the steps required to compel Israel to withdraw from the Lebanese and Syrian territory which it occupies, in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and the principle of land for peace, in order to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region. The reference to "Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias" necessarily raises the question of why there is no recommendation to take action against the armed terrorist groups that work against Syria, carrying out killings, terrorism and arms trafficking from parts of Lebanese territory.

- With regard to paragraph 9, the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that most of those fleeing to Lebanon are either members of armed terrorist groups wanted by the Syrian justice system, or persons who have been forced by those groups to leave their homes in order to create a humanitarian crisis and bring about foreign intervention under humanitarian pretexts. As regards the Syrian Army operations mentioned in the report, Syria affirms that all such operations took place within Syrian territory. Any statement to the contrary in the report is

incorrect. The report's purported concern for the stability and territorial integrity of Lebanon is belied by the lack of any concomitant concern for its security and independence, which would require prevailing on Israel to withdraw from the Lebanese territory it continues to occupy, and exercising effective pressure in order to prevent and put an end to all Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, including air violations.

- With regard to paragraph 11 of the report, the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms its position that the real obstacle to the resolution of the Shab'a Farms question is Israel's continued occupation of those Farms and the Syrian Golan, and its refusal to comply with resolutions of international legitimacy. The border cannot be delineated until Israel withdraws from the Shab'a Farms area because it is impossible to delineate the border while that area remains occupied.

- With regard to paragraph 20, the report effectively states, on the basis of accounts from Lebanese officials, that arms transfers are taking place into Syrian territory. It goes on, however, to say that the United Nations does not have the means to verify that information independently. Yet paradoxically, the report does contain a pronouncement of the United Nations concerning Syria's supposed responsibility for the killing of a Lebanese journalist, whereas there has been no definitive judgment on the matter.

- With regard to paragraphs 24 and 43, concerning Palestinian armed groups outside the camps, Syria affirms that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is governed by Lebanese-Palestinian agreements which do not concern Syria. With respect to the Palestinian positions located along the Syrian-Lebanese border that are noted in the report, we reiterate that all those positions lie within Lebanese territory. Therefore, Syria cannot intervene in that matter, which is, from a historical perspective, linked to the ultimate causes of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and other neighbouring States, including Syria. Those causes come down to the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and its refusal to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which guarantees the Palestine refugees' right to return to the homes from which they were expelled.

- The Syrian Arab Republic rejects the conclusions drawn, which are completely devoid of any firm or tangible evidence, as well as the unfair assessment contained in paragraph 37 of the report. Moreover, Syria is surprised that the report ignores the reality that the Syrian-Lebanese border is being used by armed terrorist groups backed by certain Lebanese political circles to smuggle weapons that have, in recent times, caused the death of thousands of innocent Syrians.

- Syria once again calls on the international community to play a positive and effective role in promoting the stability and civil peace of Lebanon, and the integrity of its borders and territory, by acting to end Israel's occupation of the remaining Lebanese territory, something that would have a positive impact on Syria and the entire region.